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INTRODUCTION
Anticruelty statutes exist on the books of every state and are viewed as
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important, or at least potentially important, legislation by those who pro-
mote the animal welfare model of advocacy, a model which focuses on the
humane treatment of animals rather than the prohibition of animal exploita-
tion.' This Article contends that anticruelty statutes, while noble in theory,
are ineffective in practice because they do not challenge the majority of
modem practices that exploit animals. Broad exemptions for animal agri-
culture, animal experimentation, hunting, and other institutional or "cus-
tomary" activities exist in some form in the anticruelty statutes of every
state, whether drafted by legislatures or read in by courts.
Advocates of the animal welfare approach concede that anticruelty stat-
utes suffer from many deficiencies but argue that the statutes could be im-
proved, either legislatively or judicially. Legislatively, they argue, common
exemptions could be removed or narrowed, thus increasing the amount of
animal exploitation encompassed. Judicially, they argue, judges in those
states without significant statutory exemptions could choose not to read
such exemptions into the statutes. As this Article will show, however, nei-
ther of these paths can be fruitful in a legal framework that focuses on the
humane treatment of animals rather than on their underlying exploitation.
To make meaningful reductions in animal suffering requires that we stop
using animals for human purposes, as dictated by the animal rights model of
advocacy.
The legislative framework for animal protection in the United States includes many
state and federal laws, the most notable being state anticruelty statutes, the federal Animal
Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C.S. §§ 2131-2159 (2005), and to a lesser extent the federal Humane
Methods of Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C.S. §§ 1901-1906 (2005). This article examines only anti-
cruelty statutes. Commentators who have examined the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and the
Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) have found them to be highly ineffective at pre-
venting animal suffering. For criticism of the AWA, see GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS,
PROPERTY, AND THE LAw 185-249 (1995) [hereinafter FRANCIONE, ANIMALS] (contending
that the AWA focuses on animal treatment, not use; is symbolic rather than substantive legis-
lation; is laxly administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture; and, due to standing limi-
tations on who may bring challenges under the AWA, is undercut because of the limited role
of courts); Darian M. Ibrahim, Reduce, Refine, Replace: The Failure of the Three R 's and the
Future of Animal Experimentation, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that
the "reduce, refine, and replace" approach to animal welfare, which is incorporated into the
AWA, is underinclusive in both theory and practice). For criticism of the HMSA, see GAIL A.
EISNITZ, SLAUGHTERHOUSE: THE SHOCKING STORY OF GREED, NEGLECT, AND INHUMANE
TREATMENT INSIDE THE U.S. MEAT INDUSTRY 24 (1997) ("(V]iolations of the Humane
Slaughter Act carry no penalties at all"); David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the
Hen House, Animals, Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL
RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 205, 208 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 2004) ("There can be little doubt that the [HMSA] is not being effectively
enforced"). The HMSA does not even apply to poultry, which makes up approximately 8.5
billion of the 9.5 billion farm animals slaughtered in the U.S. each year. Id.
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Part I of this Article discusses the animal rights and animal welfare ap-
proaches and also the concept of "humane exploitation." Part II introduces
the anticruelty statute and proposes reasons why legislatures have littered
many of these statutes with broad exemptions. It also explores whether
these statutes can be legislatively reformed. Part III discusses the judicial
interpretation of anticruelty statutes and the notion of interpreting these stat-
utes to include a wider range of commonly accepted practices that harm
animals.
I. ANIMAL RIGHTS, ANIMAL WELFARE, AND THE CONCEPT OF HUMANE
EXPLOITATION
In his 1996 book Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal
Rights Movement,2 Professor Gary Francione observed that there are two
general approaches to animal advocacy: the animal welfare approach and
the animal rights approach, which he promotes. The animal rights approach
maintains that we ought to abolish, rather than regulate, animal exploitation
through the application of both legal and non-legal measures. More specifi-
cally, Professor Francione urges animal advocates to seek the incremental
eradication of the property status of animals through significant legislative
prohibitions on animal use, although the political base for such change will
only arise after significant social education about the benefits to animals,
humans, and the environment that result from adopting a vegan diet (i.e.,
one that eschews all animal products).3
The animal welfare approach, on the other hand, seeks incremental im-
provements in the lives of exploited animals, but does not directly challenge
the underlying exploitation itself or the property status of animals. Some
advocates of the welfare approach, which Professor Francione refers to as
2 GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1 (1996) [hereinafter FRANCIONE, RAIN].
3 Id. at 190-219. See also Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law and Rain
Without Thunder: Ten Years Later, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2006). Pro-
fessor Tom Regan also argues in favor of a rights approach in his book The Case for Animal
Rights. See generally TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (2nd ed. 2004). There
are differences between the approaches proposed by Professors Francione and Regan, how-
ever. For instance, Professor Regan would ascribe rights only to animals he classifies as "sub-
jects-of-a-life," which he defines as "mentally normal mammals of a year or more," id. at 78,
while Professor Francione's rights theory argues in favor of basic rights for any sentient be-
ing. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE
DOG? xxxii-xxxiv (2000) [hereinafter FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION] (critiquing Regan's sub-
ject-of-a-life limitation on would-be rightsholders).
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"new welfarists, ' 4 believe that this approach will later lead to rights. In the-
ory, therefore, these advocates support the abolition of animal exploitation,
yet their short-term focus remains on regulating such exploitation, making
this somewhat of a hybrid approach.
As Professor Francione discusses in Rain Without Thunder, a central
tenet of animal welfare-whether traditional welfare or new welfare-is
that animal suffering can be significantly reduced even as animal exploita-
tion continues (i.e., that animal exploitation can be effectively regulated).
All animal welfare advocates seek measures that would require animals to
be treated "humanely" and not subjected to "unnecessary suffering" even as
their exploitation continues. This is the concept of "humane exploitation,"
or as it is positively referred to, "humane treatment." To determine whether
an animal is subjected to unnecessary suffering, the human interests from
animal exploitation must be balanced against the animal interests in not suf-
fering. 5 If the human interest prevails in any given situation, the animal suf-
fering is permitted; if the animal interest prevails, the suffering is not per-
mitted. Professor Francione persuasively argues, however, that the human
interests will almost always prevail, and that in fact this is an "unbalanced
balance," because animals are classified as legal property while humans are
classified as legal persons.
6
Despite its claimed deficiencies, the welfare approach is the prevailing
model of animal advocacy in the United States and other nations. For ex-
ample, the Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), the world's largest
animal protection organization,7 states its mission as the creation of a "hu-
mane" world and seeks to promote "respect and compassion" for animals.8
4 FRANCIONE, RAIN, supra note 2, at 36 (defining "new welfarism" as the view that "the
means to the long-term goal of animal rights is short-term welfarist reform").
5 Professor Francione contends that this idea of a balancing test is the implementation of
the utilitarian philosophy toward animal treatment first espoused by the eighteenth-century
English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, and more recently by Professor Peter Singer.
FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 130-50. For Bentham and Singer's best-known
writings on the subject of animals, see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, ch. XVII, § IV (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds.
Athlone Press 1970) (1781), and see generally PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2nd ed.
1990).
6 See generally FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION, supra note 3.
7 The HSUS has approximately 3.5 million members. DEBORAH RUDACILLE, THE
SCALPEL AND THE BUTTERFLY: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ANIMAL RESEARCH AND ANIMAL
PROTECTION 294 (2000).
8 According to the HSUS website, "The mission of The Humane Society of the United
States is to create a humane and sustainable world for all animals, including people, through
education, advocacy, and the promotion of respect and compassion." Mission Statement of
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The HSUS does not seek rights for animals, but seeks to eliminate "gratui-
tous harm" and would "take into account [animal] interests" during exploi-
tation. 9 The well-known advocacy group People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals (PETA) also favors the welfare approach, even though PETA is
thought of as a "radical" group that purports to seek animal rights, because
PETA views the rights approach as "unrealistic."' 0 Many legal scholars
also support the welfare approach. For example, Professor Cass Sunstein
believes that "meat-eating would be acceptable if decent treatment were
given to the animals used for food,"'" and Professor David Favre claims that
"[i]t is the height of human arrogance to sacrifice the welfare of existing
animals because the political system will not give complete and immediate
satisfaction."'
' 2
The welfare approach is also embodied in all U.S. animal protection
laws, including state anticruelty statutes. These statutes seek to balance the
human benefits from animal exploitation against the animal suffering that
this exploitation requires. Anticruelty statutes often predetermine, however,
that animals used for common institutional purposes such as food produc-
tion or experimentation can never win this balancing test and therefore ex-
plicitly exempt customary institutional conduct from their scope. The re-
mainder of this Article examines the efficacy of these statutes and argues
that their deficiencies, which manifest themselves through the presence of
broad exemptions, are linked to the fact that these statutes are welfare-
oriented.
1I. LEGISLATURES, SOCIETAL TENSION, AND THE INEFFECTIVE
ANTICRUELTY STATUTE
A. The Anticruelty Statute
The legislatures of all 50 states and the District of Columbia have en-
acted anticruelty statutes that purport to protect animals against "unneces-
sary suffering," "unjustified suffering," or "cruel mistreatment." For exam-
ple, the Delaware anticruelty statute defines animal cruelty as "mistreatment
the Humane Society of the United States, http://www.hsus.org/about_us/hsus
at a_glance fmancialsboard-andmission/mission_statement of the humanesociety-oft
heunited_states.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
9 FRANCIONE, RAIN, supra note 2, at 43.
10 Id. at 33.
" Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights ofAnimals, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 387, 395 (2003).
12 David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests Into Our Legal System, 10 ANIMAL L. 87,
90 (2004).
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of any animal or neglect of any animal.., whereby unnecessary or unjusti-
fiable physical pain or suffering is caused." 13 Similarly, the South Carolina
anticruelty statute states that "[w]hoever knowingly or intentionally ... in-
flicts unnecessary pain or suffering upon any animal.., is guilty of a mis-
demeanor.", 14 Although anticruelty statutes may upon first glance appear to
be meaningful legislation, they in fact provide a very narrow range of pro-
tection, often for only a limited subset of animals. 
15
Specifically, many of these statutes exclude from coverage the very ac-
tivities that cause the vast amount of animal suffering, including food pro-
duction, a category that alone constitutes approximately 98% of animal use
nationwide, or approximately 9.5 billion farm animals slaughtered per
year. 16 Other numerically significant activities that are commonly exempted
from coverage include animal experimentation, hunting, trapping, fishing,
and forms of animal entertainment such as rodeos, zoos, and circuses.17 The
efficacy of anticruelty statutes is further diminished by lax enforcement that
stems from many factors, including "real or perceived limited resources; in-
experienced staff; incomplete or botched investigations, pressure from the
community to focus on other crimes; and personal or political bias against
taking animal abuse seriously as a violent crime.
'I
Anticruelty statutes are an encapsulation of the animal welfare approach
in that they do not seek to prevent animal exploitation, but rather seek to
prevent only animal "cruelty."' 19 Stated differently, they do not seek to pre-
13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1325 (2005).
14 S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1-40 (2004).
15 FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, supra note 1, at 117-60 (detailing some of the reasons that
anticruelty statutes are ineffective, which are linked to the status of animals as legal property).
16 See, e.g., Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 206 ("Approximately 9.5 billion ani-
mals die annually in food production ... [the industry has] persuaded legislatures to amend
criminal statutes... so they cannot be prosecuted for any farming practice that the industry
itself determines is acceptable").
17 See Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anticruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5
ANIMAL L. 69 (1999) (discussing survey from 1999 which examined common exemptions in
anticruelty statutes of every state).
18 Id. at 70. See also Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the
Law's Role in Prevention, 87 IOWA L. REv. 1, 3 (2001) ("The flaw in the legal system lies
with inadequate penalties for animal abuse and apathetic enforcement of existing laws.");
Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 210 ("Enforcement of anticruelty statutes, like other
criminal statutes, is left primarily to the police and public prosecutors, who have substantial
other obligations to which they may assign a higher priority.").
19 See Mary Margaret McEachern Nunalee & G. Robert Weedon, Modern Trends in
Veterinary Malpractice: How Our Evolving Attitudes Toward Non-Human Animals Will
Change Veterinary Medicine, 10 ANIMAL L. 125, 131 (2004) ("Animal welfare theory forms
the basis of most presently existing anti-cruelty and similar legislation in the United States").
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vent animal use, only animal mistreatment given that use. Anticruelty stat-
utes attempt to balance human and animal interests, and the categorical ex-
emptions listed above reveal instances where it has been predetermined that
the human interest will always prevail.
Adherents to the welfare approach concede that anticruelty statutes
have many deficiencies, but nevertheless argue that they have merit in the-
ory and can be of some use in practice. For instance, the Animal Legal
Defense Fund (ALDF), the legal arm of the animal welfare movement, fo-
cuses its efforts on anticruelty prosecutions through its "zero tolerance for
cruelty" campaign. 2 1 Animal welfare advocates also contend that the defi-
ciencies in anticruelty statutes can be fixed. For example, Stephan Otto, the
director of legislative affairs for ALDF's Anti-Cruelty Division, concedes
that animal cruelty laws, including anticruelty statutes, are "less strong and
comprehensive than might be desired" but argues that such laws "provide
some statutory protections, raise awareness of animal abuse issues, and pro-
vide a foundation on which the next generation of laws may be devel-
oped.",22 Otto's specific suggestion for reform is for legislatures to require
that institutional exploitation be "reasonable"--in other words, to conduct
the balance of human and animal interests on a case-by-case basis rather
than predetermine its outcome in favor of humans. He states:
One simple, yet useful proposal for improving [anticruelty statute] exemptions
is to change "customary and accepted practices" (a commonly used phrase) to
"customary and reasonable practices." Such a change would enable the trier of
fact in animal abuse cases to determine whether a certain practice was reason-
able, regardless of whether it may be customary. This change could result in
the full prosecution of more abuse cases involving livestock.
2 3
20 See Robert Garner, Political Ideology and the Legal Status of Animals, 8 ANIMAL L.
77, 83 (2003) ("Although the general anti-cruelty statutes that depend upon the difficult task
of proving unnecessary suffering are not particularly effective, even these have some worth.
As Tannenbaum remarks... 'there is nothing in cruelty laws that prohibits the legal system
from giving certain animal interests greater weight than has been done in the past."') (citations
omitted); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 390 ("If taken seriously, [anticruelty statutes] would do a
great deal to prevent animals from suffering, injury, and premature death.").
21 See Zero Tolerance For Cruelty!, http://www.aldf.org/action.asp?sect=-action (last
visited Nov. 16, 2005) (discussing various Animal Defense League initiatives including the
"zero tolerance" campaign).
22 Stephen K. Otto, State Animal Protections Laws-The Next Generation, 11 ANIMAL
L. 131, 141 (2005).
23 Id. at 145. David Wolfson argues that legislative improvements should be undertaken
at the federal level to avoid industry capture of state legislatures:
The United States should legislate proper farming practices. In doing so, the gov-
ernment can reclaim, from the farming community, the power to define what is cru-
2006]
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To properly address the suggestion that legislatures could retool anti-
cruelty statutes, most notably by narrowing or removing broad exemptions,
we must first understand the factors that cause many legislatures to include
these exemptions.
B. Understanding Anticruelty Statute Exemptions
1. Societal Preference
Societal preference constitutes the primary reason why anticruelty stat-
utes include broad exemptions. As representative bodies, legislatures are
implementing a collective choice that society has made to allow the exploi-
tation of animals so long as it produces a human benefit. This balancing ef-
fort stems from an ever-present tension in the human relationship with non-
humans, or a "moral schizophrenia" as Professor Francione has
characterized it. 24 On the one hand, when questioned about their beliefs, a
majority of individuals say that they support the protection of animals from
suffering. 2 On the other hand, society's actions clearly demonstrate sup-
port for the continued use of animals, and the suffering it entails, where
such use is of any benefit to society, no matter how trivial. In simple terms,
when it comes to animals, society says one thing but does another.
This tension is palpable in anticruelty statutes. These statutes first pur-
port to prohibit "unnecessary suffering," "unjustified suffering," or "cruel
mistreatment. ' 26 Yet the broad exemptions that follow reveal society's de-
sire to prohibit animal suffering only if it is gratuitous; i.e. sadistic, waste-
ful, or not resulting in a human benefit. 27 For example, as Professor Fran-
elty to animals. Given the intense economic pressures from agribusiness in certain
states, the legislation should be federal to prevent amendments to state anticruelty
statutes that effectively negate the law's effect and result in uneven and inconsistent
laws.
David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law: Agribusiness and the Systematic Abuse of Animals
Raised for Food or Food Production, 2 ANIMAL L. 123, 149 (1996).
24 FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 1-30 (discussing how humans agree it is
morally wrong for animals to suffer unnecessarily and yet allow animals to suffer unnecessar-
ily on a regular basis).
25 See, e.g., id. at xix ("Two-thirds of Americans polled by the Associated Press agree
with the following statement: 'An animal's right to live free of suffering should be just as
important as a person's right to live free of suffering.').
26 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (giving two examples of anticruelty
statutes that use such language).
27 See, e.g., McDonald's v. Steel and Morris (McLibel), [1997] EWHC (QB), available
at http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/verdict/verdict-jud2c.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006)
("The majority of people in [the U.K.] ... eat meat and must be taken not to think badly of
[Vol. 1: 175
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cione has discussed at length, we buy the flesh of animals for food, their
skin for leather, and their pelts for fur-activities that all cause animals tre-
mendous pain and suffering, and none of which are necessary for humans to
live and thrive.28 It is well known that humans do not need to eat animal
products to live or be healthy, and that the exclusion of such products from
our diets leads to a reduction in many types of illness and disease. 29 More-
over, it is extremely difficult to argue that the use of animal products for
clothing is necessary in this modem age of synthetic materials and other
non-animal sources, such as cotton. Finally, the exploitation of animals for
entertainment, including hunting, rodeos, and circuses, cannot be said to ap-
proach the level of a necessity.
For the most part, society does not question these everyday practices yet
expresses outrage at conduct that results in similar or even less suffering but
that produces no benefit to humans.30 In effect, society's practical desire for
the benefits of animal exploitation outweighs its theoretical desire that ani-
mals suffer only if necessary, and, consequently, the exceptions to anti-
cruelty statutes swallow the rule. Facially, anticruelty statutes may indicate
that they prohibit unnecessary suffering, but, as applied, what they prevent
is gratuitous suffering, a much, much smaller subset of conduct. It is only
logical that this societal tension is reflected in the legislative enactment of
anticruelty statutes that prevent only gratuitous animal suffering.
those who are responsible for killing animals to provide that meat.").
28 See FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 9.
29 See, e.g., Paul Appleby et al., The Oxford Vegetarian Study: An Overview, 70 AM. J.
CLINICAL NUTRITION 525S (1999) (finding in a 16-year study of 6000 vegetarians and 5000
non-vegetarians in the U.K. that the vegetarians generally had lower LDL cholesterol levels
and lower death rates for each of the mortality endpoints studied); P.K. Newby et al., Risk of
Overweight and Obesity Among Semivegetarian, Lactovegetarian, and Vegan Women, 81 AM.
J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1267 (2005) (concluding that semivegetarian, lactovegetarian, and
vegan women have a lower risk of being overweight and obese then do omnivorous women);
P.A. Philips & M. Segasothy, Vegetarian Diet: Panacea for Modern Lifestyle Diseases?, 92
Q.J. MED. 529 (1999) (reviewing the beneficial effects of vegetarian diets, including lower
risks of diabetes, coronary heart disease, ocular macular degeneration, and colon and breast
cancers); Joan Sabate, The Contribution of Vegetarian Diets to Health and Disease: A Para-
digm Shift?, 78 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 502S (2003) (concluding that well-balanced
vegetarian diets could best prevent nutrient deficiencies as well as diet-related chronic dis-
eases). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Slaughterhouse Jive, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 2001, at 40
(reviewing GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS (2000)) (arguing that
"eating animals seems to be an intermediate case" of necessity and suggesting that "eating
animals is desirable" for a well-balanced diet).
30 Consider, for example, the hoarding of large numbers of animals. See Colin Berry et
al., Long-Term Outcomes in Animal Hoarding Cases, 11 ANIMAL L. 167 (2005) (discussing
the practice of hoarding).
2006]
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2. Legislative Capture
A second reason that anticruelty statutes contain broad exemptions is
legislative capture by powerful interest groups that profit from exploiting
animals. 31 Groups that profit from animal exploitation, including agricul-
tural corporations, 32 vivisectors and pharmaceutical corporations, 33 and
hunters/the National Rifle Association, 34 do wield considerable political
power. In some states this power may be exacerbated; e.g., in rural states
where animal agriculture is a large source of revenue.
35
31 See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 212 (arguing that "the fanned-animal indus-
try has persuaded the majority of state legislatures to actually amend their criminal anticruelty
statutes to simply exempt all 'accepted,' 'common,' 'customary,' or 'normal' farming prac-
tices .... It is hard to imagine any reason for this aggressive legislative agenda on the part of
industry other than a fear that it is using fanning methods that might be considered illegal un-
der prior criminal law"); Wolfson, supra note 23, at 145 ("The power of the farming industry
in the United States must be recognized in order to fully understand the conflict that such a
simple subject as the prevention of cruelty to animals raises and the difficulties facing any
attempted reform.").
32 See James A. Albert, A History of Attempts by the Department of Agriculture to Re-
duce Federal Inspection of Poultry Processing Plants - A Return to the Jungle, 51 LA. L.
REV. 1183 (1991) (tracing the history of meat inspection in the U.S. and criticizing the
USDA's efforts to ensure food safety); Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA's Struggle
to Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142 (1998) (discussing the cap-
ture of the USDA by the meat industry); Rebecca P. Lewandoski, Spreading the Liability Net:
Overcoming Agricultural Exemption with EPA 's Proposed Co-Permitting Regulation Under
the Clean Water Act, 27 VT. L. REV. 149, (2002) (stating that the powerful agricultural indus-
try has been able to gain wholesale exemptions from environmental laws due to its active lob-
bying of the legislature); J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental
Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 308-309 (2000) (stating that, under "tremendous farm industry
lobby pressure," Congress extended the implementation phase-out date for methyl bromide, a
dangerous pesticide used on crops); Betsy Tao, A Stitch in Time: Addressing the Environ-
mental, Health, and Animal Welfare Effects of China's Expanding Meat Industry, 15 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 349 (2003) (arguing that the weakening of U.S. anticruelty statutes
through exemptions and lack of enforcement is due to the significant political power wielded
by the American agricultural industries).
33 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L. J. 513, 560
(2003) ("[P]harmaceutical companies capture the regulatory process .... ).
34 See, e.g., Dena M. Jones & Sheila Hughes Rodriguez, Restricting the Use of Animal
Traps in the United States: An Overview of Laws and Strategy, 9 ANIMAL L. 135, 152 (2003)
(attributing the failure of federal anti-trapping legislation to the efforts of powerful lobby
groups representing hunting, trapping, agricultural, and commercial fur interests); see also
Rachel Shaffer, Child Access Prevention Laws: Keeping Guns Out of Our Children's Hands,
27 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1985, 1987 (noting that gun lobbyists, such as the National Rifle As-
sociation, exert "extreme political power" on the legislative process).
35 This is why David Wolfson has proposed that the regulation of animal agriculture be
undertaken at the federal level. See Wolfson, supra note 23, at 149 ("Given the intense eco-
nomic pressures from agribusiness in certain states, the legislation should be federal to prevent
amendments to state anticruelty statutes that effectively negate the law's effect.").
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But while legislative capture does contribute to the weakening of anti-
cruelty statutes, it must be viewed in relation to the broader underlying fac-
tor: societal preference. Given the current societal preferences discussed in
the previous section, the influence exerted by many interest groups, most
notably agricultural interest groups, is not undue influence. Ninety-seven
percent of Americans are not vegetarians, and ninety-nine percent of
Americans are not vegans. 36 Public demand fuels the exploitation of ani-
mals by agribusiness corporations, and therefore it cannot be said that soci-
ety objects to this exploitation. If these corporations are able to buy legisla-
tive influence, it is because consumers are providing them with the means
and the motivation to do so. 37 Consequently, when legislatures include ex-
emptions for food production, they are not acting in a counter-majoritarian
fashion. Rather, they are implementing widely held societal beliefs that
meat-eating is acceptable, and that meat, like any commodity, should be as
affordable as possible.
A more difficult question is presented by hunting, the wearing of fur,
and similar activities that harm animals, are legal, but that a majority of
Americans do not engage in or support. 38 Here industry capture and public
choice theory become more relevant. 39 To oversimplify matters, a small but
vocal group supports the exploitation while a large but passive group does
not. Lurking beneath the surface, though, is the question of why the larger
36 The Vegetarian Resource Group, How Many Vegetarians Are There?,
http://www.vrg.org/joumal/vj2000may/2000maypoll.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006) (summa-
rizing the results of the 2000 National Zogby Poll sponsored by the Vegetarian Resource
Group showing 2.5% of the U.S. population was vegetarian and 0.9% was vegan).
37 See SINGER, supra note 5, at 161-62. There, Singer observes:
The people who profit by exploiting large numbers of animals do not need our ap-
proval. They need our money. The purchase of corpses of the animals they rear is
the main support the factory farmers ask from the public (the other, in many coun-
tries, is big government subsidies). They will use intensive methods as long as they
can sell what they produce by these methods; they will have the resources needed to
fight reform politically; and they will be able to defend themselves against criticism
with the reply that they are only providing the public with what it wants.
38 See, e.g., FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at xix ("More than 50 percent of
Americans believe that it is wrong to kill animals to make fur coats or to hunt them for
sport."); see also id. at 29 (noting that although "80 percent of Americans are in favor of ban-
ning the [leghold] trap, only five states have done so, and efforts to obtain a ban at the federal
level have thus far been unsuccessful."). But see Rob Walker, Pelt Appeal: How a Little Bit
of Fur Went a Long Way Toward Reviving a Taboo Fashion Item, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006,
Magazine, at 30 (noting the recent rise in fur sales and that a 2004 Gallup poll "found that 63
percent of respondents pronounced the buying and wearing of clothing made with animal fur
'morally acceptable"').
39 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (rev. ed. 1971) (discussing public choice theory).
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group is passive.
The answer could be that animal issues are simply not a high political
priority for most people; but it could also be that most individuals in the
passive group are not vegetarians. On a fundamental level, exploitation is
exploitation, and the slaughtering of animals for food is no more necessary
than the hunting of animals for sport. Therefore, if individuals opposed to
hunting speak out against it, they risk being called hypocrites for eating
meat.40 It is a slippery slope, people soon realize, to ban one type of unnec-
essary animal exploitation without banning them all.
This concern is evident in recent attempts in the U.S. to ban the slaugh-
ter of horses for human consumption, a legislative measure that enjoys pub-
lic support. 41 The Wall Street Journal recently reported that "many farm-
state lawmakers... want to keep [horse] slaughterhouses open, in part be-
cause closing them might embolden animal-rights groups and vegetarians to
demand a ban on the slaughter of beef cattle, pigs and sheep. 42 As Iowa
Congressman Steve King (quite correctly) asked, "[w]hat is the distinction
between a steer, a hog and a horse?" Ironically, the Humane Society of the
United States, the world's largest animal welfare organization, has at-
tempted to allay fears that a ban on the slaughter of horses will lead to a ban
on the slaughter of farm animals. 43 In sum, even though the majority of
40 For instance, in response to CNN footage of a Japanese dolphin drive hunt in Futo
Harbor and the ensuing objections by Western nations, Mr. Komatsu, a Japanese delegate at
the annual meeting of the International Whaling Commission in Australia, pointed out that in
the host country:
[F]our or five million kangaroos are slaughtered every year for meat consumed do-
mestically, for leather products exported to Europe and America, and for the diver-
sion of the country's famed 'weekend hunters' firing from careening trucks. Surely
these scenes are no prettier than anything one might witness in Futo Harbor ....
How, he wonders, would the Australian delegates care to see that on film, or the
British delegates some footage of their own abattoirs, or the New Zealanders their
lambs at slaughter, or the Americans their industrial hog farms?
MATTHEW SCULLY, DOMINION: THE POWER OF MAN, THE SUFFERING OF ANIMALS, AND
THE CALL TO MERCY 149 (2002).
41 See Equine Protection Network, Horse Slaughter Polls and Survey Results, http://
equineprotectionnetwork.com/slaughter/polls.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2005) (collecting poll-
ing data from various states).
42 See Mary Jacoby, Why Belgians Shoot Horses in Texas for Dining in Europe, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 21, 2005, at Al, A8.
43 The Humane Society's website contains the following information:
Myth: A prohibition on horse slaughter creates a negative precedent for beef, pork,
and poultry producers by legitimizing efforts to end consumption of food derived
from any animal.
Fact: Americans don't eat horses, and unlike other livestock, we don't breed them
for human consumption. Additionally, horses are different from cattle (and other
[Vol. 1: 175
THE ANTICRUELTY STATUTE
Americans do not themselves benefit from exemptions for hunting and simi-
lar activities, these exemptions are not necessarily counter-majoritarian in
nature because of concerns that the removal of some exemptions in anti-
cruelty statutes will lead to the removal of all exemptions.
3. Animals as Legal Property
A third factor contributing to the inclusion of broad exemptions in anti-
cruelty statutes is the legal classification of animals as property. As Profes-
sor Francione has explained, economic theory tells us that rational property
owners will only harm their animal property for good reason; i.e., if it will
produce a societal benefit. 44 Therefore, anticruelty statutes need only pro-
tect against the irrational property owner-one who causes or allows harm
to his property that is of no benefit to society. Viewed in this manner, the
focus of anticruelty statutes on the prevention of gratuitous suffering is ef-
fectively a regulation of the irrational property owner, while the conduct of
rational property owners is exempted.
4. Efficiency and Competency
Finally, reasons of efficiency and legislative competency argue for the
inclusion of broad exemptions in the anticruelty statutes. Legislatures that
exclude "customary" or "normal" practices have made a decision to allow
industries to determine the level of animal exploitation that is most efficient
and therefore legally permissible. Underlying this deference to industry
custom is the assumption that the industry will have a relative advantage in
expertise over legislatures to determine the amount of suffering necessary to
accomplish a societally accepted benefit.45 The foregoing are all reasons
animals specifically bred, sold, and transported for human consumption) due to their
instinctive flight response in stressful conditions, making it difficult to accurately
stun them prior to slaughter. Undercover footage has demonstrated that many horses
are dismembered while fully conscious, underscoring the need to ban this utterly in-
humane process. The American public overwhelming supports a ban on horse
slaughter-horses have a special place in our heritage and they are beloved compan-
ions to millions today.
Humane Society of the United States, Common Myths about
Horse Slaughter, http://www.hsus.org/pets/issues-affecting-our.-pets/quine-protection/horse_
slaughter-common-myths.html#FactAmericans 
-dont (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
44 FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 66-67; see also McLibel [1997] EWHC
(QB) ("The U.S. has taken the approach that normal business practices will take care of that
(stocking density). If a farmer over-stocks he is going to lose money. If he loses money he is
not going to be in the business.").
45 See infra note 90 and accompanying text (giving the same reason for why courts defer
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why exemptions for institutional acts of animal exploitation are wholesale,
rather than case-specific as animal welfare advocates would prefer.
C. Why Anticruelty Statutes Cannot Be Legislatively Improved
As noted in Part II.A, supra, some animal welfare advocates argue that
anticruelty statutes could be strengthened by removing or narrowing exist-
ing exemptions (i.e., by performing the human benefit/animal suffering bal-
ancing test on a case-by-case basis) to allow for the coexistence of animal
exploitation and humane treatment. However, as this section will show,
there are several reasons why effective legislative reform of anticruelty stat-
utes is unlikely. First, and most importantly, the same factors that coalesced
to originally lead to the inclusion of broad exemptions in anticruelty stat-
utes-societal preference, legislative capture, the classification of animals
as legal property, and arguments of efficiency and competency--continue to
exist and would hamper any efforts to repeal or refine the existing exemp-
tions. As these factors have been discussed, they need not be repeated in
this section. Second, as will be discussed below, even retooled anticruelty
statutes would be ineffective if they did not challenge the underlying animal
exploitation, and the welfare approach would not reach this key deficiency.
Welfare advocates instead rely on the notion of "humane exploitation"-the
idea that animal exploitation and humane treatment can coexist with respect
to industrial production-but that idea is viable only in theory, not in prac-
tice. Finally, as will also be discussed below, the prospect of legislative re-
form raises problems of implementation that have no easy answers.
1. Incompatibility of Exploitation and Humane Treatment
For many, it is enticing to imagine a world in which animals were not
subjected to unnecessary suffering: where they could be utilized for human
benefit yet treated "humanely" at all times during that process. This is what
animal welfare advocates strive for, at least in the short-term, and what they
believe that anticruelty statutes can move us toward if these statutes embod-
ied a balancing test that ascribed more weight to animal suffering. Al-
though exploited animals could be treated better under the existing legal
framework, an approach that does not challenge the underlying exploitation
can only prevent suffering that is in excess of what is required to carry out
to industry custom).
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the exploitation. 46  Because animal exploitation by its very nature, even
done under the best of circumstances, requires the infliction of substantial
pain and suffering, and also often the death of the animal, the "excess" suf-
fering involved is small in comparison to the amount of suffering re-
quired.47
Global food production, medical and scientific research, and fur farms
are just a few examples of animal exploitation where suffering cannot be
prohibited if use is permitted. Food production, for example-the most
numerically significant use of animals by far-requires the factory farming
model to be affordable and thus sustainable, and it is well known that ani-
mals subjected to factory farming suffer considerably during their lives and
during slaughter. As James Rachels has stated:
[I]t would be impossible to treat the animals decently and still produce meat in
sufficient quantities to make it a normal part of our diets .... cruel methods
are used in the meat-production industry because such methods are economi-
cal .... Humanely produced chicken, beef, and pork would be so expensive
that only the very rich could afford them.
48
46 See FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 50-80 (revealing that the status of
animals as legal property results in human interests, however trivial, taking precedence over
animal suffering, however great, thereby permitting most animal exploitation and the suffer-
ing that accompanies it).
47 For many common methods of animal use, the argument that animal exploitation can
be permitted while animal suffering is minimized is structurally the same as that which would
exist in a law that permitted the torture of human beings but required such torture to be done
"humanely." Torture by definition requires the infliction of pain or suffering to be effective.
It is ironic that there is little serious discourse regarding the idea of the "kinder torture" of
human beings, yet humane treatment is a central tenet of the animal welfare approach. For a
recent article rejecting the idea that the use of torture can be effectively regulated, see Marcy
Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 201, 265-68 (2004).
48 James Rachels, Vegetarianism and 'the Other Weight Problem,' reprinted in JAMES
E. WHITE, CONTEMPORARY MORAL PROBLEMS 496, 503 (7th ed. 2003). See also Darian M.
Ibrahim, A Return to Descartes: Property, Profit, and the Corporate Ownership of Animals,
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing that the cost of animal welfare is
too great to be an affordable option for the vast majority of consumers); Farm Subsidies De-
bated in Global Trade Talks (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 11, 2005),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4953604 (last visited Feb. 1, 2006)
(discussing Swiss agriculture, which is supposed to be kinder to animals but to be economi-
cally viable requires government subsidies of up to 90% of a farmer's income. One farmer
interviewed quoted the price differential between Swiss pork chops and German pork chops,
which are not produced by the more humane methods, as 600%); SINGER, supra note 5, at 160
("It is not practically possible to rear animals for food on a large scale without inflicting con-
siderable suffering. Even if intensive methods are not used, traditional farming involves cas-
tration, separation of mother and young, breaking up social groups, branding, transportation to
the slaughterhouse, and finally slaughter itself.").
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In McDonald's v. Steel and Morris,49 more commonly known as the
"McLibel" case, a McDonald's executive was asked, "As the result of the
meat industry, the suffering of animals is inevitable?," to which he replied
"The answer to that must be 'yes."' The judge posing the question re-
sponded, "I do not suppose that his reply surprised anyone." 50 Similarly, it
is difficult to see how laboratory animals can be subjected to deadly dis-
eases such as anthrax, botulism, tularemia, smallpox, and the plague without
suffering considerably in the process, yet such experiments are increasingly
a part of bioterrorism research after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
and subsequent anthrax attacks.5 '
Therefore, while it may be theoretically possible to refine anticruelty
statutes to provide animals with some comfort, the amount of comfort pro-
vided would be minimal if the underlying use is allowed to continue. To
permit the exploitation is to permit the suffering, and an approach that seeks
to reduce suffering without abolishing use can accomplish very little.
2. Further Problems of Implementation
Even if humane exploitation were an attainable ideal, it would be diffi-
cult to implement and police. For instance, it would be difficult to expect
those who profit from exploiting animals to have enough respect for the
animals they exploit to treat them humanely. By classifying animals as le-
gal property, as things that we can kill or harm for even trivial reasons, we
have devalued animal life to the point where it is unrealistic to expect any-
thing other than inhumane treatment.5 2 It is an incoherent position to main-
tain that animals have value only as resources and at the same time argue
that we should respect their interests in not suffering.
" McLibel, [1997] EWHC (QB), available at http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/ ver-
dict/verdictjud2c.html. This case is discussed in Part IlI.C, infra.
50 Id.
51 See Code Orange for Animals in Bioterrorism Research, http://www.hsus.org/ ani-
mals in research/animals in researchnews/code_orangejfor.animals in bioterrorismjrese
arch.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (predicting that tens of thousands of animals will be sub-
jected to these and other deadly diseases); Ibrahim, supra note 1.
52 See SINGER, supra note 5, at 159-60, where Singer notes that:
[Piractically and psychologically it is impossible to be consistent in one's concern
for nonhuman animals while continuing to dine on them. If we are prepared to take
the life of another being merely in order to satisfy our taste for a particular type of
food, then that being is no more than a means to our end. In time we will come to
regard pigs, cattle, and chickens as things for us to use, no matter how strong our
compassion may be; and when we find that to continue to obtain supplies of the bod-
ies of these animals at a price we are able to pay it is necessary to change their living
conditions a little, we will be unlikely to regard these changes too critically.
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Also, the enforcement of broader anticruelty statutes would be highly
problematic. In their present inception, anticruelty statutes are most often
used to prevent gratuitous cruelty to dogs and cats-animals that our society
views as special and unique. Yet as previously noted, animal welfare advo-
cates concede that anticruelty statutes are laxly enforced even for this very
limited purpose. 53 Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that the concern will
be greater for animals that end up on our dinner plates or that are being used
in experiments that scientists claim will benefit humans. Of course en-
forcement may improve if we allowed individuals and entities besides
prosecutors to initiate anticruelty actions. 54 But to even discover violations
requires access to private or government property, 55 and it is an increasing
concern that federal laws such as the USA PATRIOT Act56 or the Animal
Enterprise Protection Act 57 will be used against peaceful animal advocates
whose sole purpose is to film what happens to animals inside factory farms
and laboratories.
III. ANTICRUELTY STATUTES AND THE COURTS
A. Anticruelty Statutes Without Legislative Exemptions
Anticruelty statutes that do not exempt animal husbandry and other in-
stitutional uses of animals are no stronger than those that do contain these
exemptions.58 This is because courts have exempted broad categories of
53 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (giving some reasons for lax enforcement of
anticruelty statutes).
5 See Cass R. Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES
AND NEW DIRECTIONS 251, 252 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (dis-
cussing the potential benefits of giving private parties standing to sue on behalf of animals);
William A. Reppy, Jr., Citizen Standing to Enforce Anti-Cruelty Laws by Obtaining Injunc-
tions: The North Carolina Experience, 11 ANIMAL L. 39, 41-44 (2005) (discussing civil en-
forcement of North Carolina's anticruelty statute).
55 Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 210 ("Even if the police and prosecutors were
eager to enforce criminal anticruelty statutes, it is virtually impossible for enforcement agents
to ascertain what occurs on the average farm because a farm is private property.").
16 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
terpret and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001).
57 Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.S. § 43 (2005). On the state
level, for example, the Missouri legislature has recently reintroduced Missouri Bill SB 615,
known as the "Animal Production Facility Act," which would make it a felony to distribute
photos of any agricultural or animal facility. http://www.senate.mo.gov/06info/
BTSWeb/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BiIIID=197 (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
58 The following states do not exempt animal husbandry: Alabama, Arkansas, Califor-
nia, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
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animal use from the reach of anticruelty statutes even when the statute itself
contains no explicit exemption. 59 Even though courts have consistently read
anticruelty statutes very narrowly, some animal welfare advocates have ar-
gued that courts retain the discretion to extend the application of these stat-
utes to common uses of animals so long as the statute itself contains no ex-
plicit exemption. In other words, these advocates argue that the absence of
explicit exemptions gives courts discretion to find that even common uses
of animals may constitute statutory cruelty. Both Professor Jerrold Tan-
nenbaum and Professor Mike Radford, for example, view the use of "un-
necessary suffering" language in anticruelty statutes as permitting the defi-
nition of animal cruelty to judicially evolve. Professor Tannenbaum states:
The ability of cruelty laws to expand their range of prohibited activities as so-
ciety's views about appropriate treatment of animals changes allows for vigor-
ous ethical debate about how animals should be treated. It also allows for in-
clusion within the class of legally prohibited behavior activities that come,
over time, to be generally seen as inappropriate.
6 0
Professor Radford echoes this view in discussing British animal welfare
laws:
The concept of unnecessary suffering, which has been developed by the courts
and widely adopted by the legislature, has two very considerable merits. First,
it may be applied to a multitude of different situations. Secondly, it can be
constantly reinterpreted by the courts in light of greater understanding about
animal suffering, and changing social attitudes regarding the proper treatment
of animals. These valuable characteristics dispense with the need constantly
to amend and update the legislation. The prohibition on unnecessary suffering
has undoubtedly made a major contribution to improving the treatment of ani-
mals.
61
David Wolfson appears to adopt a similar view when he suggests that
anticruelty statutes might be used to prohibit use of the veal crate. While
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island. For a survey of exemptions in anti-
cruelty statutes from 1999, see Frasch et al., supra note 17, at 75-79.
59 See FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 58 ("Even if an anticruelty statute
does not explicitly exempt particular animal uses, courts have effectively exempted our com-
mon uses of animals from scrutiny by interpreting these statutes as not prohibiting the inflic-
tion of even extreme suffering, so long as it is incidental to an accepted use of animals.").
60 Jerrold Tannenbaum, Animals and the Law: Property, Cruelty, Rights, 62 SOC. RES.
539, 588 (1995).
61 MIKE RADFORD, ANIMAL WELFARE LAW IN BRITAIN 258 (2001). See also Robert
Garner, Animal Welfare: A Political Defense, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 161 (2006) (advocat-
ing an evolving notion of unnecessary suffering).
62 David J. Wolfson, McLibel, 5 ANIMAL L. 21, 50 (1999) (discussing the McLibel
Court's approach to cruelty, and stating that "[t]he proper application of this standard, both in
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the notion of "unnecessary suffering" may be flexible in theory, there are
several reasons why courts cannot or will not criminalize common institu-
tional acts against animals, even absent a legislative exemption, including
principles of statutory interpretation and the constitutional requirement of
fair warning.
B. Why Courts Cannot Interpret Anticruelty Statutes More Broadly
1. Legislative Intent
Courts interpret anticruelty statutes with or without explicit exemptions
narrowly in part because principles of statutory interpretation dictate that
courts look to legislative intent when interpreting ambiguous statutes.63
Phrases such as "unnecessary suffering" may be broad, but they are by no
means prohibitions on all suffering. The modifier "unnecessary" presup-
poses that some suffering is acceptable, and the ambiguity lies in determin-
ing how much suffering is acceptable; or, to put it differently, what did the
legislature mean by "unnecessary"? As stated in Part II.B. 1, supra, societal
preference has dictated that unnecessary suffering actually means gratuitous
suffering; i.e., suffering inflicted without a corresponding societal benefit.
Therefore, even when legislatures fail to explicitly exempt an activity that
causes animal suffering, courts will find an implicit exemption if that activ-
ity produces a human benefit.
In Taub v. State,64 for example, a well-known case in which the defen-
dant/researcher Taub was accused of seventeen counts of animal cruelty for
experiments on monkeys, the court stated that:
[I]t can readily be seen that the legislature has consistently been concerned
with the punishment of acts causing "unnecessary" or "unjustifiable" pain or
suffering. Furthermore, clearly the legislature recognized that there are certain
normal human activities to which the infliction of pain to an animal is purely
incidental and unavoidable, and in such instances, [the anticruelty statute] does
not apply.
65
The anticruelty statute in Taub contained no statutory exemption for
animal experimentation. In fact, the Maryland anticruelty statute explicitly
the United States and Europe, could prohibit numerous cruel common farming practices; for
example, the veal crate."). The McLibel case is discussed in Part III.C infra.
63 For a recent discussion of statutory interpretation, see Caleb Nelson, Wat is Textual-
ism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347 (2005).
64 463 A.2d 819 (Md. 1983).
65 Id. at 821.
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exempted other animal uses but did not exempt experimentation. 66 Never-
theless, the court held that Taub's conduct was beyond the reach of the anti-
cruelty statute because experimentation fell under the umbrella of the "nor-
mal human activities" for which animals are made to suffer. The court did
not reach the issue of whether the experiments were cruel; it only asked
whether the experiments were part of a normal human activity. Once the
activity was condoned, anything customary that took place in its pursuit was
also condoned. To hold otherwise would be to subject those conducting
normal human activities to prosecution-a prospect that raises the signifi-
cant constitutional issues addressed in the next section.
2. Criminal Statutes Require Fair Warning
Anticruelty statutes are criminal statutes, and criminal law requires that
defendants have fair warning that their conduct is proscribed before acting.
The constitutional requirement of fair warning, in short, "condemns judicial
crime creation." 67 "The essential idea is that no one should be punished for
a crime that has not been so defined in advance by the appropriate author-
ity"-in most cases, the legislature. 68 Fair warning manifests itself in the
"void-for-vagueness" doctrine69 and the rule of lenity, 70 the former being
the more important.71 The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a stat-
ute be sufficiently clear to enable a person of ordinary intelligence to deter-
66 MD. CODE ANN., [Criminal] § 59 (1976). See also Hammock v. State, 592 S.E.2d
415, 418 (Ga. 2004) (interpreting a statute "[w]ith the aid of two well-known and related prin-
ciples of statutory construction: expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expression of one thing
implies exclusion of another) and expressum facit cessare taciturn (if some things are ex-
pressly mentioned, the inference is stronger that those not mentioned were intended to be ex-
cluded)").
67 RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 85 (2d ed. 2004).
68 Id.
69 See John Calvin Jeffies, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Stat-
utes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 196 (1985) ("[T]he vagueness doctrine is the operational arm of le-
gality").
70 See id. at 200 (stating that lenity "has been presented as an implementation of legal-
ity").
71 See id. at 198 (stating that lenity "survives more as a makeweight for results that seem
right on other grounds than as a consistent policy of statutory interpretation"). See also
Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal Crimi-
nal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 455, 455 (2001) (identifying a third form of the fair warning
doctrine, "that a court may not apply a 'novel construction or a criminal statute to conduct that
neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope"')
(quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 (1997)).
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mine what is proscribed.72 A statute can be vague either on its face or as
applied to a defendant under particular circumstances.
73
Both facial and as-applied vagueness challenges to anticruelty statutes
have been largely unsuccessful-so far. The typical facial challenge has fo-
cused on general language regarding the provision of "necessary" or
"proper" food, water, and shelter to an animal. Courts have overwhelm-
ingly held that such provisions are not unconstitutionally vague on their face
simply because they are general.74 Similarly, although the term "animal" in
an anticruelty statute may be generic and may hypothetically be deemed to
include insects, for example, courts have not found such statutes vague
when the nonhuman in question was clearly an animal as people of ordinary
intelligence construe that term.75 Several courts have noted that anticruelty
statutes must be written in general terms because it would be impossible to
list every variation that would constitute statutory cruelty.76  Most as-
72 The case often cited for this requirement is Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964). "The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for con-
duct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." Id. at 351 (quoting United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
73 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95
(1982).
74 See People v. Speegle, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384, 388 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]he
terms 'necessary,' 'needless,' and 'proper' all give fair notice of an objective standard of rea-
sonableness in the provision of sustenance, drink, and shelter, and in the avoidance of inflic-
tion of suffering"); People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447, 449-52 (Colo. 1983) (citing numerous
cases in support of the holding that anticruelty statute proscribing the failure to provide an
animal with "proper food, drink, or protection from the weather" is not unconstitutionally
vague); State v. Webb, 130 S.W.3d 799, 827-28 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (adopting the rea-
soning in Allen and Speegle); Wilkerson v. State, 401 So. 2d 1110, 1111-12 (Fla. 1981) (hold-
ing that the modifier "unnecessary" does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague, and
citing cases in support). But see State v. Bright, No. 22071-7-I 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS
1218, at * 1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 2, 1999) (holding that a Washington anticruelty statute pro-
scribing the failure to provide "the proper food, drink, air, light, space, shelter, or protection
from the weather" was unconstitutionally vague).
75 See Wilkerson, 401 So. 2d at 1111-12 (holding that a raccoon was within the statutory
definition of "animal" which included "every living dumb creature"); State v. Kaneakau, 597
P.2d 590 (Haw. 1979) (holding that a gamecock was within statutory definition of "animal"
which included "every living creature"). See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618
(1954) ("If the general class of offenses to which the statute is directed is plainly within its
terms, the statute will not be struck down as vague, even though marginal cases could be put
where doubts might arise.").
76 See Speegle, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 388 ("There are an infinite number of ways in which
the callously indifferent can subject animals in their care to conditions which make the hu-
mane cringe. It is thus impossible for the Legislature to catalogue every act which violates the
statute."); Tuck, 467 A.2d at 733 ("To require more precision would be to require the legisla-
ture to draft a detailed code on the care and feeding of animals. The case law on vagueness is
not so demanding."). This issue is also encountered in child protection laws. See Allen, 657
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applied vagueness challenges to anticruelty statutes have also failed, as in
Tuck v. United States,77 where the evidence was overwhelming that the con-
duct, the starvation of puppies, was of a nature that the ordinary person
would know is proscribed.78
The decisions which have upheld anticruelty statutes against vagueness
challenges, both facial and as-applied, fit within a standard mold. The de-
fendant's conduct was clearly gratuitous abuse and was of no benefit to so-
ciety. For example, the starvation of animals typically serves no human
end,79 nor does the infliction of pain or suffering on animals for sheer sadis-
tic pleasure. These do not present hard cases because there can be little
doubt that these defendants knew their conduct was proscribed.
If anticruelty statutes are to evolve, however, as animal welfare advo-
cates suggest, they must encroach upon customary and societally accepted
human activities to have more than symbolic significance. This is because
almost all animal suffering, statistically speaking, is caused by customary
and societally accepted activities. 80  Therefore, the pertinent question is
what would happen if courts began interpreting anticruelty statutes without
legislative exemptions to prohibit societally accepted conduct. Could
courts, for example, hold that institutional practices which cause immense
animal suffering on the modem factory farm, such as intensive confinement
P.2d at 450 ("We have often evaluated the constitutionality of similar statutory standards pro-
scribing child abuse. The principles developed in the child abuse and neglect cases are appro-
priately applied to the analysis of the statute forbidding cruelty to or neglect of animals.").
" 467 A.2d 727 (D.C. 1983).
78 See id. at 733. There, the court noted:
Appellant argues... that even if the [anticruelty] statute is not unconstitutionally
vague on its face, its application to him is so vague as to violate due process. He is
wrong .... Given extensive testimony that puppies in appellant's custody were suf-
fering from dehydration and malnutrition, that they were being kept in cages without
water, that they were weakened to the point where many were unable to stand up,
and that they were desperate in their eagerness for the food placed before them, the
jury had ample evidentiary basis for convicting appellant as charged.
See also Webb, 130 S.W.3d at 828 ("A statute is not invalid simply because it may be argua-
bly vague in a hypothetical instance but is clearly applicable to the complaining party .... We
conclude that [the Tennessee anticruelty statute] is sufficiently specific to warn defendants of
the proscribed conduct.").
79 An exception to this general rule is the practice of "forced molting," where spent hens
are starved for up to two weeks to induce one last cycle of egg production before the hens are
slaughtered. See KAREN DAVIS, PRISONED CHICKENS, POISONED EGGS: AN INSIDE LOOK AT
THE MODERN POULTRY INDUSTRY 74-76 (1996). Forced molting has not been prohibited by
anticruelty statutes.
80 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing customary and societally
accepted uses of animals that cause the vast majority of animal suffering yet are exempted
from the scope of anticruelty statutes).
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and forced mutilation, violate anticruelty statutes that do not exempt animal
husbandry? What about extremely painful animal experiments conducted in
states whose anticruelty statutes do not exempt animal experimentation?
It seems that successful void-for-vagueness challenges could be raised
if courts began to issue such rulings. These activities, however "cruel" in
the ordinary sense of the word, are not the type of activities that courts have
held are legally cruel. 8' They do not cause gratuitous animal suffering, but
rather are customary and efficient ways of furthering currently accepted so-
cietal ends. Individuals and businesses routinely engage in institutional acts
that produce enormous amounts of animal suffering. These actors do not
have reason to believe that anticruelty statutes prohibit this conduct because
the statutes never have. Therefore, anticruelty statutes do not provide insti-
tutional exploiters of animals with fair warning that their conduct is prohib-
ited.82
Another aspect of the void-for-vagueness doctrine should be mentioned.
That is, when analyzing a statute for vagueness, courts will also inquire into
whether the statute provides an ascertainable standard of guilt so as to not
invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 83  Challenges on this
ground would almost certainly result if courts attempted to criminalize cus-
s For further discussion of the difference between cruelty in the common sense and in
the legal sense, see the discussion of the McLibel case in infra Part III.C.
82 Vagueness would also be a problem if applied to non-institutional animal uses that are
accepted as legitimate, such as suffering inflicted for the purposes of training an animal. The
case of State v. Fowler, 205 S.E.2d 749 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974), is a good illustration. In
Fowler, the defendant beat his dog Ike and tied him up. His wife then filled a hole with water,
and he submerged Ike's head for forty-five seconds before bringing it back up. This went on
for fifteen to twenty minutes. The defendant then untied Ike, hit and kicked him, and tied him
to a pole near the water-filled hole. The court reversed Fowler's conviction for cruelty to
animals and ordered a new trial, stating that "the jury ... should have been instructed that if it
believed the defendant's evidence, that the punishment was administered for a disciplinary
purpose, it should return a verdict of not guilty." Id. at 751. Training methods are not ex-
empted from North Carolina's anticruelty statute now, nor were they when Fowler was de-
cided. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-360 (1969). Nevertheless, because inflicting some pain to
train companion animals is accepted in our society, and because it had not been proved that
the defendant's conduct was "willful" as required by the statute, the court granted a new trial.
83 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) ("The void-for-vagueness doctrine
requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordi-
nary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encour-
age arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."); see also John F. Decker, Addressing Vague-
ness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV.
241, 246 (2002) (discussing due process concerns related to constitutionally vague laws, in-
cluding notice issues and arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement); Jeffries, supra note 69, at
206-12 (opining that the notice test is an unpersuasive rationale and that the prevention of ar-
bitrary and discriminatory enforcement is the "most important concern").
2006]
JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW AND ETHICS
tomary uses of animals, as defendants could argue that police and prosecu-
tors targeted only certain types of institutional conduct that may in fact be
indistinguishable from other types. For example, many people find the rais-
ing of veal calves reprehensible and do not eat veal. But it is difficult to see
how veal crates differ from gestation crates for pigs and battery cages for
hens, and most people eat pork and eggs. 84 Similarly, it is difficult to see
how forced mutilation practices, such as tail docking 85 and debeaking, 86 dif-
fer from each other or from other factory farming practices. These are all
routine practices on the factory farm, and all cause incredible amounts of
animal suffering so that meat can be made affordable to the public. Judicial
rulings that some of these customary practices are criminal while others are
not would raise troubling issues under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
3. Standards for Decision-Making
Compounding the other barriers to broader judicial interpretation of
anticruelty statutes is the challenge of finding a workable standard for courts
84 Gestation and farrowing crates are usually two feet wide and prevent sows from mov-
ing at all. See FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 10. In battery cages, chickens
used for egg production are typically packed together four or five in a wire cage that is about
the size of a folded newspaper. See id.
" "Tail docking" is where an animal has its tail cut off, usually at a very young age,
with pliers and without anesthesia. Cows' tails are docked to make them easier to milk, al-
though docking deprives cows of valuable protection against flies that land on their backs.
Pigs' tails are docked in an effort to make them more sensitive to pain. When pigs are
crowded together in factory farms they will go mad and bite each other's tails. Hog farmers
want bitten pigs to resist these bites (or else the bitten pig may well be killed and mutilated,
wasting a valuable source of income). As Scully writes:
Termed in the field a "short-term stressor," docking doesn't remove the target. The
idea is to leave each tail more sensitive, so that the pain of a bite is sharper and the
pigs will therefore try harder to avoid attack. Otherwise the pigs display what is
known in both animal and human psychology as learned helplessness. They just
give up, their tails get chewed and infected, the infection spreads, and they die an
unauthorized death.
SCULLY, supra note 40, at 276. Evidence suggests that tail docking, in addition to being very
painful for the animals, produces no benefits for humans or animals. See Carolyn L. Stull et
al., Evaluation of the Scientific Justification for Tail Docking in Dairy Cattle, 220 J. AM.
VETERINARY MED. ASSN. 1298, 1301-02 (2002) (reviewing various scientific studies on tail
docking of cattle and concluding that "there are no apparent animal health, welfare, or human
health justifications to support this practice").
86 Young chickens are "debeaked" by having their beaks sliced off with hot metal, or
even with a knife or scissors, so that they will not peck at each other during their intensive
battery cage confinement. Evidence suggests that debeaking, in addition to causing chronic
pain, has lasting repercussions for the animals such as making it difficult for them to eat or
drink. See DAVIS, supra note 78, at 67-71.
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to use in differentiating among various institutional practices. Rather than
developing their own standards for determining animal cruelty, the legisla-
tures that include explicit exemptions have made the choice to defer to in-
dustry custom. When there is no legislative exemption, the decisionmaking
task falls to courts, which will defer to industry custom for the same reasons
legislatures do. Both legislatures and courts have decided that if a practice
which inflicts suffering on animals is customary in the industry, it is not
within the scope of the statute.
Animal advocates have quite rightly decried this approach because it al-
lows industries to determine the criminality of their own conduct.87 Yet it is
understandable why courts, in particular, may adopt this approach. First,
judicial reliance on industry custom provides ex ante certainty, which, as
discussed in Part III B.2, supra, is a requirement for fair warning. Second,
deference to industry custom provides a discernible standard for judicial de-
cision-making, which other standards could not do. For example, if the
standard were a judge's own sense of what constitutes cruelty, the judge
would be in the position of deciding, on an ad hoc basis, which institutional
practices cause unnecessary suffering and which do not.88 Because virtually
all institutional uses of animals cause unnecessary suffering, 89 a judge (or
jury) attempting to draw such distinctions would be hopelessly lost. Third,
deference to industry custom provides for efficiency in administration. It
would be inefficient for courts to inquire into each act of animal exploitation
to determine whether it is "cruel." Further, it would be costly for judges to
acquire the institutional competence necessary to rival that of the industry.
The avoidance of such costs is one reason why the business judgment rule
87 See generally Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1. In addition, Professor Francione has
observed:
This [deference to industry custom] approach stands in marked contrast to that used
to solve similar problems in the law. For example, in determining whether conduct
constitutes negligence, juries may consider conformity to custom as evidence of rea-
sonable behavior, but it has long been recognized that the customary nature of con-
duct does not make the conduct reasonable, and that the jury must determine whether
the defendant balanced the amount of risk generated by her conduct with an appro-
priate amount of caution.
FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, supra note 1, at 141.
88 Chief Justice Bell's seemingly random conclusions in the McLibel case about which
factory farming practices are and are not cruel illustrate this concern. See infra Part III.C (dis-
cussing the problems associated with determining whether a practice is legally cruel without
workable standards, as illustrated by the McLibel case).
89 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacy of anti-
cruelty states in preventing unnecessary animal suffering in industry practices across the
United States).
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exists in corporate law, where courts defer to the decisions of boards of di-
rectors provided those decisions meet minimal procedural criteria. 90 There-
fore, courts deciding animal cruelty cases rely on industry custom, an in-
quiry which presents the singular question, more easily answered, of
whether the defendant's act was customary for the industry.
C. McLibel
England's McLibel case of 1997 illustrates the dangers encountered
when judges inquire into the cruelty of common institutional treatment of
animals without a workable standard.9' McLibel was a defamation action
brought by industry giant McDonald's against two individuals who distrib-
uted leaflets critical of McDonald's. The leaflets claimed, among other
things, that McDonald's was responsible for the murder and torture of
countless farm animals. The judge who decided the case, Chief Justice Bell,
framed the issue as whether the leaflet accurately stated that McDonald's
was "culpably responsible for cruel practices in the rearing and slaughter of
some of the animals which are used to produce their food.",
9 2
What makes this case notable is the standard that Chief Justice Bell
used to determine whether a particular practice was legally "cruel," and ac-
cordingly whether the defendants were libel for defamation. He first re-
jected as potential standards the ordinary meaning of cruelty 93 and also
standards set by governmental regulations. 94 He then rejected the American
standard of industry custom. 95 Instead, he opted to differentiate the prac-
90 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2nd Cir. 1982) (discussing the business judg-
ment rule); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of
Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 675 (2002) (de-
scribing the business judgment rule as a court's emphasis on the process of directors' business
decisions, rather than the substance of those decisions).
91 McLibel, [1997] EWHC (QB).
92 Id.
9' In rejecting the ordinary meaning of cruelty, Chief Justice Bell stated:
The first [potential approach] was that any practice which caused an animal to suffer
any degree of stress or discomfort or transitory pain was necessarily cruel. I cannot
accept this .... [An] ordinary person may know little about the detail of farming and
slaughtering methods but he must find a certain amount of stress, discomfort or even
pain acceptable and not to be criticised as cruel.
Id.
94 See id. (finding that governmental standards "are useful measures of animal wel-
fare.., but they do not necessarily judge what is cruel or not").
95 Specifically, Chief Justice Bell stated:
The second [potential] approach was to say that any practice which accorded with
the norm in modem farming or slaughter practices was thereby acceptable and not to
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tices based on his own opinions, aided by expert testimony. Chief Justice
Bell framed the issue as "whether a practice is deliberate and whether it
causes sufficiently intensive suffering for a sufficient duration of time to be
justly described as cruel."96 Although there are significant differences be-
tween McLibel and a hypothetical U.S. anticruelty prosecution, McLibel
provides the best example to date of a court attempting to implement the
animal welfare idea of an evolving standard of animal cruelty. And at least
one animal welfare advocate has suggested that McLibel could provide a ju-
dicial standard for U.S. courts deciding anticruelty cases. 97 For the reasons
discussed in this Article, however, the McLibel standard could not be ap-
plied in U.S. anticruelty cases.
For instance, it is unclear how such a subjective standard could satisfy
fair warning requirements. Judicial interpretations can serve to remove
vagueness in statutes, and thereby provide fair warning to future defen-
dants.98 The McLibel standard of cruelty, however, is so subjective that fair
warning could only be said to exist as to the particular institutional practices
previously addressed by courts. Numerous favorable cruelty prosecutions
would be required to develop this body of law.
Further, McLibel can only be viewed as unprincipled, ad hoc decision-
making, the type of decisionmaking that deference to industry custom
avoids. One commentator has suggested that Chief Justice Bell merely ap-
plied his own value judgments regarding animal cruelty. 99 The standard
be criticised as cruel. I cannot accept this approach either. To do so would be to
hand the decision as to what is cruel to the food industry completely, moved as it
must be by economic as well as animal welfare considerations.
Id.
96 See id. ("I must use my own judgment, helped by the witnesses, when their views
seem sensible, to decide [whether a practice is cruel].").
9' Wolfson, supra note 62, at 50 (discussing McLibel and stating that "[t]he proper ap-
plication of this standard, both in the United States and Europe, could prohibit numerous cruel
common farming practices; for example, the veal crate"). Wolfson does observe that anti-
cruelty statutes "pose a myriad of problems for individuals who wish to argue that a particular
animal production practice constitutes animal cruelty," including a lack of interest in en-
forcement and the risk of trying the case to a jury "comprised of individuals from a farming
district," id. at 31, but he does not discuss the factors identified in this article.
98 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLuM. L. REV.
2162, 2199 (2002) ("A [prospectively applied] judicial interpretation that itself is not vague
cures any vagueness or fair warning problem in the original statute.").
99 In her article about McLibel, Marlene Nicholson states:
Defendants also benefited from Justice Bell's willingness to find justification to sup-
port the label 'cruel,' even though he had not found justification for the label 'bad' to
describe working conditions. Both issues should have been dealt with as matters of
opinion, which are not provable as false. Instead, he treated them as facts, but sur-
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adopted by Chief Justice Bell--"whether a practice is deliberate and
whether it causes sufficiently intensive suffering for a sufficient duration of
time to be justly described as cruel"-provides no guidance on what is suf-
ficient, what is intensive, what is suffering, or how long is long enough.
Compare, for instance, the court's analysis of two common means of killing
the unwanted male offspring of the egg industry: crushing them between a
pair of rotating rollers, and suffocating them in a drum containing carbon
dioxide. Most factfinders would have difficulty distinguishing between
these practices from a normative perspective (e.g., while the rollers seem
worse, the suffocation may take longer), and it is readily apparent that a
criminal conviction-possibly a felony conviction-should not depend on
such subjectivity. Yet the McLibel court held that crushing the chicks was
cruel but gassing them was not.100 In fact, the McLibel opinion is replete
with such examples distinguishing seemingly indistinguishable conduct on
an ad hoc basis. This illustrates the near-impossible task that U.S. courts
would face if they were inclined to deem only some, but not all, institutional
acts of exploitation to be legally cruel and thus in violation of anticruelty
statutes.
CONCLUSION
Animal welfare advocates rely on the notion that animal exploitation
and humane treatment can coexist with respect to the use of animals for
food, experimentation, hunting, and other human benefits. Although these
advocates recognize that existing anticruelty statutes have many deficien-
cies, most notably the inclusion of wholesale exemptions for institutional
uses of animals, they nevertheless contend that these statutes could be re-
formed, either legislatively or judicially, to narrow these exemptions and
ascribe more weight to an exploited animal's interest in not suffering.
This Article reveals that, although legislatures could certainly require
better treatment of exploited animals, a law that does not challenge the un-
derlying exploitation itself can at best only prevent suffering that is in ex-
cess of what is required to carry out the exploitation. Because the very na-
ture of animal exploitation requires the infliction of tremendous suffering,
prisingly found one fact to be true and the other to be false. In rejecting the one la-
bel and accepting the other, Justice Bell may well have been reflecting his own value
system. It is certainly questionable whether such value choices are consistent with
free and open expression in a democratic society.
Marlene Arnold Nicholson, McLibel: A Case Study in English Defamation Law, 18 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 1, 102 (2000).
1'O McLibel, [1997] EWHC (QB).
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the amount of excess suffering that a reformed anticruelty statute could pre-
vent is minimal. This Article also reveals that courts do not have the discre-
tion to interpret anticruelty statutes more broadly for a variety of reasons,
including the constitutional iequirement of fair warning. This Article con-
cludes that anticruelty statutes, while noble in theory, are ineffective in
practice precisely because they do not challenge the underlying exploitation
of animals, but instead focus on humane treatment. To prevent animal suf-
fering requires preventing animal use: a realization that presents difficult
moral questions that society must begin to confront.
